IDF Targeting Practices: Intelligence, Behaviour and the Laws of Armed Conflict

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), its targeting process is an intelligence-led, human-supervised system designed to identify military objectives while applying the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution.

This system operates in an exceptionally difficult urban battlefield in which Hamas embeds military personnel, weapons, command infrastructure and tunnel networks within densely populated civilian areas.

Any assessment of Israeli targeting practices needs to distinguish between several different questions: how Israel identifies military targets, how intelligence is processed, who authorises strikes, how civilian presence is assessed, and what precautions are taken before weapons are employed.

The IDF's own published explanation states that information systems are used to help intelligence analysts gather and analyse information from multiple sources. The IDF specifically rejects the description of its systems as autonomous artificial intelligence that independently identifies people as terrorists or decides who should be killed. Human analysts must independently examine proposed targets and verify that they meet the relevant legal and military criteria.

IDF: Use of AI and Targeting Practices

1. The Strategic Context: Israel's War Against Hamas

The Israeli targeting system cannot be separated from the circumstances in which it operates. Following the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attack, Israel declared its objective to dismantle Hamas's military capabilities and prevent further attacks against Israeli civilians.

From Israel's perspective, this is not a conventional war in which opposing armies are separated by clearly defined front lines. Hamas operates through an urban environment, uses underground infrastructure and can move personnel and weapons between civilian and military spaces.

The IDF asserts that this makes intelligence particularly important. The military must identify not merely where hostile forces are, but what their military role is, how they are connected to wider Hamas networks and whether a proposed attack can be carried out without excessive civilian harm.

2. Status-Based Targeting: Identifying Known Hamas Operatives

One component of Israeli targeting involves individuals whose affiliation with Hamas or another organised armed group has been established through intelligence.

Military affiliation: The IDF states that an individual identified as a member of an organised armed group such as Hamas's military wing may constitute a lawful military target, subject to the applicable circumstances and legal requirements.
Command and specialist roles: Intelligence can identify commanders, weapons specialists, rocket personnel, tunnel operatives, intelligence personnel and others involved in Hamas's military structure.
Network analysis: Israeli intelligence can combine information from multiple sources to establish relationships between individuals, locations, weapons systems and military activity.
Continuously updated intelligence: A person or location does not simply become a permanent target because it appears in a database. The IDF says its systems are intended to provide analysts with updated intelligence and that individual target assessments remain necessary.

3. Behaviour-Based Targeting and Immediate Threats

Not every threat can be identified in advance through a formal target list. Warfare produces rapidly changing situations in which individuals can begin directly participating in hostilities without previously being identified as targets.

Israeli forces therefore also use real-time intelligence and battlefield observations. Examples can include individuals preparing attacks, planting explosives, launching rockets, transporting weapons or conducting other military activity.

This should not automatically be equated with a "signature strike" in which suspicious behaviour alone becomes sufficient for lethal action. The Israeli description of its process involves combining behavioural information with other intelligence, determining the military nature of the activity and considering the surrounding circumstances.

The Israeli rationale is therefore not that behaviour automatically makes someone a target. Rather, behaviour can become one component of a wider intelligence assessment indicating military activity or an immediate threat.

4. The Sensor-to-Shooter Process

JNS reporting has described the IDF's targeting procedure as a "sensor-to-shooter" cycle: intelligence is collected, analysed, verified and transferred through operational channels before a strike is authorised.

JNS reported that the IDF's process includes verification that a proposed target is genuinely a military target and assessment of non-combatants in the surrounding area. The reporting also described an additional assessment of how the target should be engaged and what the consequences of the attack might be.

According to that account, the Israeli Air Force can independently analyse a proposed target, determine the appropriate munition and assess the immediacy of the threat. Pilots are also required to verify conditions before engaging where circumstances permit.

In particularly sensitive locations, including areas near hospitals, schools or mosques, JNS reported that additional senior-level authorisation may be required.

JNS: The IDF's Meticulous Targeting of Hamas in Gaza

5. Artificial Intelligence: Acceleration Rather Than Autonomous Lethal Decision-Making

One of the most controversial aspects of Israeli targeting is the use of artificial intelligence and large-scale data analysis.

The IDF's stated position is that these systems help analysts process information at a speed and scale that would be impossible for humans working manually.

The Jerusalem Post has reported that the IDF's AI capabilities can reduce the time required to identify potential targets from much longer periods to minutes in some circumstances.

The Jerusalem Post: 'Ready, aim, fire': This is how the IDF targets Hamas terrorists in Gaza

The IDF has also stated that systems such as those commonly referred to as "Habsora" ("The Gospel") do not autonomously decide who should be attacked. Rather, the systems can process intercepted communications, imagery and other intelligence to identify potential military objectives, which are then subject to human review.

The Jerusalem Post has similarly reported that human approval remains a critical element of the targeting process.

The Jerusalem Post: Human approval and AI targeting

The distinction matters. There is a substantial difference between using software to identify a potential target and allowing software to independently authorise the use of lethal force.

6. Why Israel Says Faster Intelligence Can Increase Precision

Speed and precision are not necessarily contradictory.

A military target can have a very short operational lifespan. A Hamas commander can move locations, a rocket team can relocate, weapons can be transported underground, or an attack team can disappear into a civilian environment.

Faster intelligence processing can therefore provide a narrower opportunity in which a military objective can be attacked before it disappears.

The Jerusalem Post has described the integration of intelligence collection, AI-assisted analysis and the targeting command as significantly increasing the speed at which potential targets can be identified.

The objective is not simply to create more targets. It is to obtain enough information quickly enough to make a more informed decision while a legitimate military objective remains identifiable.

7. Human Review and Command Responsibility

The IDF's published position emphasises that analysts must conduct independent examinations of proposed targets.

For each target, the IDF says commanders assess anticipated military advantage and expected collateral damage before authorising an attack.

The IDF also states that the assessment must be based on information available before the strike rather than the outcome observed afterwards.

This distinction is important. The legality of an attack cannot be determined simply by looking at casualties after an event. The relevant question includes what the attacking force reasonably knew and anticipated when the decision was made.

IDF explanation of target assessment and proportionality

8. Civilian Presence and the Problem of Hamas's Embedded Military Infrastructure

Hamas's operating methods create an unusually difficult targeting environment.

The IDF says Hamas has operated military personnel and infrastructure from within or adjacent to residential buildings, hospitals, schools, mosques and other civilian locations.

This claim is central to Israel's explanation for civilian casualties. If a military objective is deliberately located among civilians, attacking it can produce risks that would not exist if the same objective were located in an isolated military base.

The point is, it is not that civilian presence makes an attack automatically lawful. Rather, civilian presence increases the importance of target verification, proportionality assessment and feasible precautions.

Hamas's use of civilian environments therefore does not remove Israel's obligations, but it does materially affect the operational circumstances in which those obligations have to be applied.

9. Civilian Warnings and Evacuation Measures

Civilian protection begins before a weapon is fired.

The IDF has used a range of warning mechanisms, including telephone calls, text messages, leaflets, maps and evacuation instructions, where it considers warnings operationally feasible.

The Jerusalem Post has documented Israeli warning methods and the development of more geographically specific evacuation instructions during the Gaza war.

The Israeli rationale is that warnings can create physical separation between civilians and military activity, thereby reducing the foreseeable civilian risk of subsequent operations.

10. Precision Weapons and Choice of Attack Method

The IDF considers the appropriate method and munition for each strike, taking into account the target's structure, geographic surroundings and nearby civilian presence.

The clear majority of munitions used in strikes are precision-guided weapons. It also states that aircraft systems are used to calculate release points when unguided munitions are employed.

This is important because the military's objective is not merely to identify a target, but to determine how the target can be attacked while limiting foreseeable harm.

11. Strikes Can Be Cancelled or Delayed

The Israeli stand is strengthened by reporting describing cases in which strikes have been cancelled, delayed or adjusted when civilian presence is detected.

The Jerusalem Post has reported an example in which an IDF pilot suspected that children were near a proposed target and called off the strike.

The Post has also reported that targeting personnel routinely call off attacks when civilians are detected nearby, with the possibility of waiting for another opportunity to strike the military objective.

The Jerusalem Post: IDF pilot calls off airstrike after suspecting children nearby

Such examples do not establish that every Israeli strike complies with international law. They do, however, provide evidence relevant to Israel's claim that civilian protection is incorporated into operational decision-making.

12. Civilian Casualties and the Question of Intent

One of the most important distinctions in the debate is between civilian casualties and deliberate targeting of civilians.

Civilian deaths are unquestionably serious. But the existence of civilian casualties does not by itself establish that civilians were the intended target of an attack.

A military operation can be directed against a legitimate military objective while nevertheless causing civilian deaths. The legal assessment then depends on factors including the anticipated military advantage, expected civilian harm and feasible precautions.

Israel Hayom reminds that this distinction is frequently lost in public discussion of Gaza, particularly when casualty figures are treated as direct evidence of Israeli intent.

Israel Hayom: The truth behind claims Israel is targeting civilians

13. Why Civilian Casualty Figures Alone Cannot Establish Targeting Intent

A casualty figure can demonstrate the human cost of a conflict, but it cannot by itself answer every legal question about the attacks that produced those casualties.

A rigorous investigation would need to examine individual incidents, including:

the identity and military function of the intended target;
the intelligence available to the attacking force;
the expected military advantage;
the expected number and location of civilians;
the weapon selected;
whether warnings were feasible;
whether the attack could have been delayed;
and whether commanders had information that should have changed the decision.

This incident-specific approach is more demanding than simply attributing every civilian death to deliberate targeting, but it is also more consistent with how the law of armed conflict evaluates individual attacks.

14. Hamas's Military Use of Civilian Infrastructure

Hamas's use of civilian infrastructure creates a fundamental operational dilemma.

If a command centre, weapons facility, tunnel entrance or rocket position is located inside a civilian environment, Israel cannot simply assume that the military objective has ceased to exist because civilians are nearby.

At the same time, civilian presence imposes additional constraints on the attack.

The Israeli position is therefore not that "human shields" make everything permissible. Rather, Hamas's tactics make target verification and proportionality assessment more difficult while increasing the importance of feasible precautions.

15. Why Urban Warfare Changes the Operational Calculation

In addition, Israeli forces face substantial risks from Hamas's underground infrastructure, concealed explosives, ambushes and short-range attacks.

A commander therefore faces a choice between different methods of achieving a military objective. Delaying action may allow a Hamas unit to relocate, launch an attack, move weapons or disappear underground.

The use of accurate intelligence and precision weapons can sometimes reduce the need for larger ground operations and therefore reduce overall exposure of both Israeli soldiers and civilians to prolonged fighting.

16. The October 7 Dimension

Israel's targeting campaign also includes individuals identified as participants in the October 7 attack.

JNS has reported multiple cases in which the IDF said it identified and targeted Hamas personnel who participated in the October 7 invasion and subsequently remained involved in military activity.

More recent JNS reporting has described cases in which alleged October 7 perpetrators were targeted after being identified as threats to Israeli forces.

JNS: IDF kills Hamas terrorist tied to October 7 Zikim attack

JNS also reported in August 2026 that an alleged Hamas Nukhba commander who participated in the October 7 attack was killed in an Israeli airstrike, with the IDF stating that precision munitions and aerial surveillance were used to mitigate civilian harm.

JNS: IDF targets Hamas commander linked to October 7

From Israel's perspective, these cases demonstrate the difference between targeting Palestinian civilians as a population and targeting specifically identified members of an armed organisation who participated in attacks against Israel.

17. Recent Examples of Immediate-Threat Targeting

JNS reporting has also documented Israeli claims concerning strikes against Hamas personnel who posed immediate threats to Israeli troops.

In July 2026, JNS reported that the IDF had killed two Hamas operatives in separate northern Gaza strikes, including an individual the military said was preparing explosive attacks near Israeli forces. The IDF stated that precautions were taken to reduce harm to noncombatants, including aerial surveillance and precision-guided munitions.

JNS: IDF kills two Hamas terrorists who posed threat to troops

JNS similarly reported in May 2026 that an alleged Hamas operative planning imminent sniper attacks was targeted in a precision strike, with the IDF again citing aerial surveillance and precision-guided munitions as precautions.

JNS: IDF kills Hamas terrorist planning Gaza sniper attacks

18. The "Signature Strike" Label

Critics sometimes describe Israeli behaviour-based targeting using the term "signature strike."

That terminology can obscure the distinction between identifying a person solely from an abstract behavioural pattern and using behaviour as one element of a broader intelligence assessment.

The Israeli system described by the IDF combines intelligence databases, human analysts, surveillance, operational information, military affiliation and real-time battlefield information.

Behavioural indicators should therefore not automatically be equated with a standalone lethal authorisation.

19. The Case for Technology as a Civilian-Protection Tool

An important but often overlooked aspect of technology can be used not only to identify military targets but also to identify civilians.

The IDF asserts that better intelligence about population movements, buildings, roads, infrastructure and military activity allows commanders to make more informed decisions about where and when to strike.

From this perspective, technological sophistication can potentially reduce civilian harm because it gives commanders more information before acting.

The points can be summarised as follows:

Better information can allow a military to identify a narrower target, select a more suitable weapon, choose a better time to strike, issue more specific warnings and cancel an attack when circumstances change.

20. Exceptional Incidents and Military Investigations

Israel does not claim that mistakes or unlawful conduct are impossible. Its position is that exceptional incidents should be investigated individually rather than being treated automatically as evidence of a general policy.

The IDF maintains a military justice system and publishes investigations into selected incidents involving alleged misconduct or civilian deaths.

The existence of such investigations does not establish that every incident is handled correctly, nor does it prove that all allegations are unfounded. It does demonstrate that Israel has mechanisms through which particular incidents can be examined and, where appropriate, referred for further legal action.

The IDF's published materials include investigations into specific incidents, including the April 2024 killing of World Central Kitchen personnel, as well as other alleged misconduct.

IDF: Information Regarding Conduct During the Swords of Iron War

21. A Five-Part Framework for Evaluating an Israeli Strike

A useful framework for evaluating individual Israeli targeting decisions is to ask five questions:

Was there a legitimate military objective? What was the target and what military function did it perform?
What intelligence supported the decision? Was the target identified through multiple sources and was the information current?
What was known about civilians? What information was available concerning civilian presence and movement?
What military advantage was anticipated? How significant was the expected military benefit of the operation?
What precautions were feasible? Could the attack have been delayed, altered, cancelled, preceded by a warning or conducted with a different weapon?

This approach avoids two simplistic conclusions: that every civilian death proves deliberate targeting, or that every Israeli strike is automatically justified because Hamas operates among civilians.

22. Overall Assessment

Taken together, the Israeli military's own published explanations and reporting from JNS, Israel Hayom and the Jerusalem Post present a targeting architecture considerably more complex than the claim that Israel simply "uses AI to target people."

The system described in these sources is better understood as an intelligence-intensive targeting process combining:

human intelligence analysis;
signals and technical intelligence;
aerial surveillance;
large-scale data processing;
AI-assisted identification of potential military objectives;
analysis of military affiliation and behaviour;
real-time battlefield information;
civilian-presence assessment;
weapon and timing selection;
human command authority;
legal review where required;
and the possibility of cancelling or modifying attacks.

The Israeli rationale is consequently that technological sophistication is intended to make military operations more informed and more discriminating, rather than to remove human responsibility from decisions to use lethal force.

Israel says it is attempting to use intelligence, technology, human review and operational precautions to dismantle Hamas's military capabilities while reducing civilian harm in an exceptionally difficult battlefield.

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